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RECENT CASES

INDIANS-HUNTING

AND

FISHING

RIGHTS: -STATE

LAW

MUST

YIELD TO FEDERAL TREATY-Defendant, a full-blooded Chippewa In-

dian, was arrested for possession of lake trout out of season under
a regulation issued by the State Conservation Commission under
authority of a Michigan Statute.' He was convicted and the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision. 2 Defendant, in appealing to the
Michigan Supreme Court, alleged his arrest and conviction violated
the Chippewa Indian Treaty of 1854,3 which provided that Indians
retain the right to fish within their reservation.4 The State contended that the bay where defendant was fishing was not within the
reservation boundaries. The supreme court declared the boundaries
of the reservation of no consequence to the case because the "....
right to fish must have included the right to fish on the Keweenaw
Bay. . . . Any other construction of the treaty would make the
right granted by the treaty without substance. '" The game regulations were held invalid as applied to defendant and other Indians.
People v. Jondreau,384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W. 2d 375 (1971).
Treaties made by the United States with Indian tribes have been
upheld in the courts as the supreme law of the land.8 Thus, state
law must yield when inconsistent with treaty provisions 7 and is
null and void as applied to the Indian tribe with which the treaty
was made.8
Maintenance of relations between the United States and Indian
tribes has traditionally been a federal responsibility.9 Worcester v.
1. M.C.L.A. § 308.201 (1967). "Commercial fishing laws; suspension by conservation
commission. See. 1. The provisions of any other act to the contrary notwithstanding,
the provisions of any statute or law of this state governing commercial fishing may be
suspended, abridged, extended, or modified by the conservation commission when, in
the opinion of said commission, such action Is necessary for the better protection, preservation, maintainance and harvesting of such fish. The existing statutes and laws regulating commercial fishing shall remain in full force and effect unless suspended, abridged, extended or modified by order. of the conservation commission in the manner herein
provided, or by subsequent acts of the legislature."
2. People v. Jondreau, 15 Mich. App. 169, 166 N.W.2d 293 (1970).
8. Treaty of Sept. 80, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109.
4. Id. at 1111, Art. 11.
5. People v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 875, 378 (1971).
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." See Skokomish Indian Tribe
v. France, 269 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1959).
7. See generally United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
8. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1959).
9, Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
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Georgia ° declared that states do not possess jurisdiction over Indian
nations and that regulation of Indian rights is solely within the
power of the United States and the Indian nations. Later decisions,
however, held that states could exercise their police power over
Indian tribes; particularly where hunting and fishing rights are
involved. 1 ' Consequently, a conflict of authority has resulted. For
example, in Ward v. Race Horse,1 2 the court held that a state's
right to impose hunting and fishing regulations upon Indians was
a valid exercise of its police power."3 Moreover, it has been held
that a state, in exercising its police power, may impose on Indians
any reasonable hunting and fishing regulations. 14 This reasonable
test essentially ignores treaty rights and imposes the same regulation on Indians as non-Indians.
Litigation has increased sharply in recent years as the courts,
in attempting to balance the interests of the states' police power
and tribal treaty rights, have searched for a test which will protect
both interests. The development of a workable standard was further
confused by Tulee v. Washington." Tulee recognized a state's right
to regulate hunting and fishing as a legitimate exercise of the
police power provided Indians are not discriminated against. Subsequently, courts have derived three possible tests from Tulee:'1 the
absolute test;' 7 the indispensable test;' 8 and the reasonable and
necessary test.' 9
The absolute test prohibits a state from regulating Indian rights
to hunt and fish where such rights are protected under federal law
or treaty. This doctrine is based primarily on the Supremacy
Clause. 20 Critics claim the absolute test gives Indians the right to
destroy natural resources and ruin fishing for sport and as a com2
mercial enterprise. '
The indispensable test prohibits imposing regulations on Indians
10.

Id.
11. See Tulee v. Wash., 315 U.S. 681 (1942) ; Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916);
Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
12. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
13. Id. at 513.
14. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556, 563-564 (1916).
15. Tulee v. Wash., 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
16. For a more detailed discussion of these various tests see, 43 WAH.
L. Rv.670
(1968). Numerous law review articles have been written on Indian hunting and fishing
rights, the application of tests, and doctrines the courts have applied In dealing with
these rights. Each article Interprets the tests in a similar but distinct manner. For
more information on these various tests see Burnett, Indian Hunting, Fishing, Trapping
Rights: The Record and the Controversy, 7 IDAHO L. REv. (1970); Hobbs, Indian Hunting
and Fishing Rights I, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1251 (1969) ; Note, 59 CALn. L. REV. 485
(1971); Note, 10 ARIZ. L. REv. 725 (1969).
17. State v. Satiacum, 50 Wash.2d 513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957). See also State v. Arthur,
74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953). This case was cited extensively In the instant case.
18. Maison v. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169
(9th Cir. 1963).
19. Puyallup v. Dept. of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
20. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. See note 6 supra.
21. See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962). The Supreme
Court, in dictum, gives an Indication that It does not favor this test.
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unless regulation of non-Indians and Indians who no longer retain
treaty rights to fish is insufficient for the preservation of fish in
quantities sufficient to sustain commercial interests. This doctrine
requires a curtailment of all non-Indian fishing before any regulations may be imposed on Indians who have retained treaty fishing
rights. Criticism is directed at the fact that such a standard does
22
not foster sound fishing management.

The reasonable and necessary test seeks to maintain a balance
between the Indian treaty rights and the state's police power in pursuit of a distinction between regulations as applied to Indians and
non-Indians. Under this doctrine states may regulate fishing by
Indians when necessary for the conservation of resources. 23 This
standard differs from the reasonable test, discussed previously, in
that under the reasonable doctrine a state may ignore treaty rights
and place regulations on Indians without showing any necessity for

applying them and without any distinction from non-Indian regulations.
Recently the United States Supreme Court has recognized a
distinction between on-reservation and off-reservation rights, giving
states greater leeway to regulate off-reservation fishing. 24 In Menominee Tribe v. United States,25 an on-reservation case, the court
held that the Menominee Termination Act of 196126 did not super22. 43 WAsH. L. REv. 670, 677 (1968). These critics say that should an emergency
arise losses could be devastating before regulations could be imposed on Indians. It
would seem, however, that Indians would also be adversely affected should such an
emergency not be met. It is likely in such a situation that the tribes would Impose regulations on their own fishing. See generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
States have generally been allowed to exercise Jurdisdiction over certain areas of
tribal affairs in accordance with this case. The test, however, Is that a State can impose jurdisdlction so long as it does not Interfere with tribal self-government. As many
tribes do have their own game regulations, see note 50 infra, a state's imposition of
game laws may interfere with the rights of tribal self-government. This Is true even In
Public Law 280 States, see note 31 infra.
23. In the lower court's decision In Puyallup the state was given authority to Impose
regulations when necessary for the preservation of fisheries. Dep't. of Game of Wash. v.
The Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 245, 422 P.2d 754 (1967). The Supreme Court
limited this power to meet the needs of conservation of natural resources. See discussion
Infra.
24. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 4,04 (1968) deals with on-reservation
rights: Puyallup v. Dept. of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392 (1968) deals with off-reservation rights. Indian off-reservation fishing rights are generally shared In common with
all the citizens of the state. The court said that since the state may exercise its police
Dower in regulating non-Indian citizens there is no reason for the state not to regulate
Indian fishing. While a state may not bar Indians from fishing where they have off-reservation rights, it may limit the mode, size of take, etc. This Is especially true where
Indians fish commericially. See discussion infra. Generally state laws have been held not
applicable to on,-reservation fishing rights. See Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
(1832); Moore v. United States, 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 827
(1947) ; United States v. Romaine, 255 F. 253 (9th Cir. 1919) ; United States ex. rel. Lynn
v. Hamilton, 233 P. 685 (W.D.N.Y. 1915)
In re Lincoln, 129 F. 247 (N.D. Cal. 1904);
In re Blackbird, 109 F. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1901); Kiamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 139
F. Supp. 634 (D. Or. 1956); State v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 16 N.W.2d 752 (1944)
State v. Cloud, 179 Minn. 180, 228 N.W. 611 (1930).
25. Menominee Tribe v. United States 391 U.S. 404 (1968). This case strongly upheld
Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962). See also Maison v. Confederated Tribes, 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963); Mekah Indian Tribe v. Schoettler, 192
F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1951).
26.
25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1970). This act was a result of the House Concurrent Resolution 108, passed August 1, 1953, 67 Stat. B132, which read in part: "[I]t is the
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cede the Wolf River Treaty of 185421 in which the Tribe2 8 retained
exclusive hunting and fishing rights on lands not ceded by them.
A specific statement by Congress terminating those rights would
be necessary in order to void the Indians' inherent rights to hunt
and fish.

29

In Puyallup v. Dept. of Game of Washington,0 which concerned
off-reservation fishing rights, the Court declared that a state may
regulate Indian rights when reasonable and necessary for the preservation of game. Since the Indians' right to fish is held in common
with all citizens the Supreme Court stated that while a state may
not impair the Indians' right to fish it may regulate the manner
of fishing, the size of the take, and place restrictions on commercial
fishing in the interests of conservation.2 1
policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the Territorial
limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same Privileges
United States . . . and
and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of theAmerican
"
citizenship ....
to grant them all of the rights and, prerogatives pertaining to
27. Treaty of May 12, 1854, 10 Stat. 1064. The treaty contained no exclusive fishing
rights clause. It did say that the reservation was ". . . to be held as Indian lands are
held." From this clause exclusive fishing rights were Inferred.
28. It is interesting to note that the termination act, note 26 supra, had supposedly
terminated the tribe as a legal entity, yet the courts still recognized the group of
Indians for the purpose of bringing the suit, as the "Menominee Tribe" even though Congress did not.
29. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968). See also State v.
Sanapaw, 21 Wis.2d 377, 124 N.W.2d 41 (1963), cert. denied, 877 U.S. 991 (1964), rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 871 (1964).
30. Puyallup v. Dept. of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392 (1968). Puyallup placed certain limitations on the state's power under the reasonable and necessary doctrine. First, all
regulations must be necessary for the preservation of fish. Second, state restrictions must
not discriminate against Indians. Third, regulations must meet appropriate standards.
See also Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 907 (D. Ore. 1969) where the court, in
expanding on Puyallup, stated that before a state may regulate Indian fishing at their
usual and accustomed places:
It must establish preliminary to regulation that the specified proposed
(a)
regulation Is both reasonable and necessary for the conservation of the fish
resource. In order to be necessary, such regulations must be the least restrictive which can be imposed consistent with assuring the necessary escapement of fish for conservation purposes; the burden of establishing such facts
is on the state.
Its regulatory agencies must deal with the matter of the Indians'
(b)
treaty fishing as a subject separate and distinct from that of fishing by
others. As one method of accomplishing conservation objectives it may
lawfully restrict or prohibit non-Indians fishing at the Indians' usual and
accustomed fishing places without imposing similar restrictions on treaty
Indians.
It must so regulate the taking of fish that the treaty tribes and their
(c)
members will be accorded an opportunity to take, at their usual and
accustomed fishing places, by reasonable means feasible to them, a fair and
equitable share of all fish which it permits to be taken from any given run.
The court went on to declare that a state does not have the same latitude in prescribing the management objectives and the regulatory means of achieving them when regulating Indians. In order to place any regulation on Indians the state must show
necessity for conservation and preservation. It must show a need to limit the taking
of fish and the regulations Imposed on Indians must be necessary to achieve the limitation. The state must take cognizance of all treaties. In formulating regulations for
conservation the state cannot manage the fishing so that little or no harvestable portion
of the run remains to reach the upper portions of the streaams where the Indians
historically fish. Such regulation would constitute discrimination against Indians. Id. at
909.
31. Puyallup v. Dept. of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392, 898 (1968). Beyond the
Supreme Court's power to interpret Indian treaty rights, Congress may enact legislation
regulating Indian rights and such legislation has been upheld in the courts. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally Healing v. Jones, 174 F. Supp. 211 (D. Ariz. 1959);
See Donahue v. Calif. Justice Court for KIamath Trinity Judicial Dist., 15 Cal. App.8d
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In the instant case Jondreau was arrested for fishing in a bay
of Lake Superior. The boundaries of the reservation were designated
township lines along the bay where Jondreau was fishing. The state
contended that by law township lines do not extend into the Great
Lakes; thus, it asserted, defendant had no right to fish in the
bay because he was not within the reservation. In declaring that
legal boundaries of the reservation were irrelevant to the case,
the court skirted a major concern in most cases involving hunting
and fishing rights - whether or not the rights being dealt with
are off-reservation or on-reservation rights. 32 The treaty language
was construed to mean that the Indians retained the right to fish
in the bay of Lake Superior without the court actually declaring
whether the bay was within the reservation. 3 The Jondreau court
relied on an Idaho decision, State v. Arthur,3 4 to support Jondreau's
contention that treaties are the supreme law of the land and supercede state law as stipulated in Article VI of the United States Constitution. 8 5 Arthur, which has won only limited acceptancee applies
the absolute test to the question of Indian treaty rights.
557, 93 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1971), which held that Congress has the power to limit a tribe's
right to sell fishing licenses to non-Indians. In 1953 Congress enacted Public Law 280
which permitted states to pass constitutional amendments removing the disclaimers
imposed on them by their enabling acts (18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970)). These disclaimers
excluded Indian reservations from state jurisdiction. See N.D. CONST., art. XVI, § 203
(1958). North Dakota enacted the proper legislation, N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19, to make it
a Public Law 280 State, but the reservation Indians did not give their approval. Eleven
states are Public Law 280 States, some of which do not have control over all reservations
within their boundaries. The law, however, specifically disallowed a state to tamper with
the Indians' rights to hunt, fish, and trap where a treaty or federal policy would be
violated. See Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962) ; 18 U.S.C. §
1162(b) (1970). Acts of Congress which alter any treaty rights are narrowly construed;
thus only those rights specifically taken away are presumed to have been altered. See
discussion of Leech Lake Band of Chippewa v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (1971) at
note 49 infra. The Department of Interior also has limited authority to regulate hunting
and fishing by Indians. See U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, at 495-500
(1958) reprinted by Oceana Publications Inc. (1966). But see Mason v. Sams, 5 F.2d
265 (W.D. Wash. 1925) where the court declared that the Interior Department must
compensate Indians for any losses resulting from reguIation of hunting and fishing
rights. This power of the Interior Department is significant to the Jondreau case because the treaty specifically allows the President to alter the treaty fishing provisions.
See discussion infra.
32. The court in Jondreau did not rely on the two leading Supreme Court cases of
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) and Puyallup v. Dept. of Game
of Wash., 391 U.S. 392 (1968). See discussion supra. Instead the court looked to the
intent of the treaty language. The court, in interpreting the treaty language, followed
the guideline set down in Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed
to their prejudice. . . . How the words of a treaty were understood by this
unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of
construction.
See also Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 n. 2 (1968) ; United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-381 (1905) ; Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119
U.S. 1, 28 (1886). The court does cite Menominee as an example of the modern trend In
such cases but does not rely on It as principle precedent. Puyallup is also cited, but
only to show that citiznship of the Indian does not void treaty rights.
33. People v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375, 378 (1971). In a strict
legal sense the bay was not within the reservation boundaries as township lines do not
extend into the Great Lakes. See People v. Bouchard, 82 Mich. 156, 46 N.W. 232 (1890).
84. State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953).
35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cL 2. See note 6 supra.
36. In State v. Satlacum, 50 Wash.2d 513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957) the Supreme Court
of Washington adopted the absolute doctrine of Arthur, but six years later in State
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The appellate court in Jondreau
affirmed the decision on the
8
basis of People v. Chosa,' which covered an almost identical fact
situation. Chosa followed the reasonable test set down in Kennedy
v. Becker,39 which allowed a state to impose any reasonable regulations on Indians without regard to treaty rights.4 0 The Michigan
Supreme Court, in reversing the appellate court's decision in Jondreau, cited numerous cases limiting the scope of the reasonable
doctrine and recognizing the supremacy of Indian treaties. 41 In
42
overruling Chosa, the supreme court said it had two major flaws.
First, Chosa did not recognize the treaty provisions as superior to
state law. 43 Second, Chosa claimed that because Indians are citizens
of the United States, they are subject to state laws."

The court, in following the absolute doctrine in the instant case,
45
did not rule out the application of other doctrines in future cases.
Since the treaty contained a clause allowing the President to revoke
or limit the Indians' right to fish 4 s the court said that state
fishing regulations need not be applied in this case.4 7 The concurring
opinion, however, ruled out the application of other tests and would
have adopted the absolute doctrine as the governing force in all
48
future cases.
There are no North Dakota cases concerning Indian hunting and
V. McCoy, 63 Wash.2d 421, 387 P.2d 942 (1963) the same court refused to follow Arthur.
Since the latter case the absolute doctrine has had little influence in similar cases
in the Pacific Coast region.
37. People v. Jondreau, 15 Mich. App. 169, 166 N.W.2d 293 (1970).
38. People v. Chosa, 252 Mich. App. 154, 233 N.W. 205 (1930).
39. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916). See discussion supra.
40. Brief for Petitioner as Amicus Curiae, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of
Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) at 9, sharply criticized the reasonable and necessary
doctrine. First, the test generally subjects the Indians to the same regulations nonIndians must follow. Second, the Indian treaty rights would not be recognized. Third,
the general rule of interpreting treaties in favor of the Indians would not be followed.
Fourth, many Indians fish for subsistence and out of economic necessity. (Salmon fishing
Is an Indian commercial enterprise along the Columbia River System. There Is also
Indian commercial fishing in Alaska and In Red Lake Chippewa Reservation in
Minnesota.) Fifth, hunting and fishing are of great cultural significance to the Indian:
One not familiar with Indians--cannot appreciate how important hunting and
fishing rights are to them, not only because of their poverty, but also because of their Indian traditions. Hunting and fishing (by individuals for subsistence has a symbolic, perhaps quasi-religious meaning to many Indians. It
is a practicing of their ancient culture, something many of them cling to
fiercely in the face of efforts of state governments, and sometimes even
the federal government to eliminate Indian rights in the name of progress
and equality. Many non-Indians feel that treaty promises made one hundred
years ago have outlived their purpose. The Indians think not; to them the
treaty promises are as alive as if made yesterday. Id. at 9. (1971).
41. People v. Jondreau. 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375, 378-379. Menominee Tribe
v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S.
45 (1962) ; Maison v. Confederated Tribes, 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Mekah Indian
Tribe v. Schoetller, 192 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1951).
42. People v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375, 379-380, (1971).
43. This is contra to Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
44. This Is contra to Puyallup v. Department of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392,
398 (1968).
45. People v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375, 381 (1971).
46. Treaty of Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat 1109, at 1111.
47. People v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375, 381 (1971).
48. People v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375, 383 (1971).
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fishing rights. 49 The tribes of North Dakota have their own tribal
codes, some of which contain game regulations governing Indians
within the reservation." North Dakota reservations are checkerboarded with tribal land, individual Indian land, and non-Indian land.
Indians may hunt on tribal land and individual Indian land, but
generally cannot hunt on non-Indian land within the reservations. 1
The validity of this practice, however, may be questioned in the
future. One court held that a treaty right to fish at usual fishing
stations meant that Indians could fish on non-Indian land over the
owner's objections. This case concerned off-reservation rights but
the same principles might apply to on-reservation non-Indian land.
A federal district court, however, declared that an Indian does
not have an easement to cross non-Indian land within a reservation
53
to get to his treaty hunting grounds.
Should North Dakota courts ever litigate the question of Indian
hunting or fishing rights, the opinion in State v. Lohnes,54 may serve

as a guideline. Though the facts do not concern hunting or fishing,
this opinion's reasoning is similar to that of the court in Jondreau
and other similar cases. Lohnes recognized the state's limited authority over Indian tribes, the federal role of protecting the Indians'
55
rights, and the importance of fulfilling the treaty obligations.
49. There have been decisions concerning fishing rights in Minnesota. The Supreme
Court upheld treaty fishing rights on the White Earth Reservation on the basis of
the Supremacy Clause. State v. Cooney, 77 Minn. 518, 80 N.W. 696 (1899). Accord.
State v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 16 N.W.2d 752 (1944); State v. Cloud, 179 Minn. 180,
228 N.W. 611 (1930) ; Cohen v. Gould, 177 Minn. 398, 225 N.W. 435 (1929). In a recent
case dealing with on-reservation fishing rights the court stated that abrogation of
treaty rights to hunt and fish cannot be implied from specific alteration by Congress of
other treaty rights concerning land holdings. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v.
Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Minn. 1971).
50. TURTLE MOUNTAIN TRIBAL CODE Os 1968, Ch. 1.25, p. 52.7. This section grants
North Dakota game officials the right to enforce North Dakota fishing regulations
only on non-Indians. The Tribal Council has exclusive right to regulate Indians. This
code at ch. 1.20, Sec. 1.2033 p. 30 also prohibits deer hunting between sunset and sunrise
and penalizes any one caught hunting deer by use of an artificial light. THE DEVILs LAKE
Sioux TRIBAL CODE (1968 Revision), Ch. IX, Sec. 9.12, p. 52 contains a similar provision.
An interesting case concerning tribal code fishing regulations is State v. Gowdy, Or.
App. 424, 4.62 P.2d 461 (1969), rehearing denied, (1970). Here Indians had off-reservation
fishing rights that were regulated by tribal code. Defendant Indians who were fishing
in violation of the tribal code were penalized by a state court rather than by an Indian
tribal court. The convictions were upheld on the grounds that since defendants were not
acting in accordance with tribal regulations they were outside the treaty rights to which
they would otherwise be entitled. In sustaining the conviction the state did not have to
show a need for limiting the taking of fish, nor show that the regulation was indispensable to the accomplishment of the needed limitation.
51. Personal interviews with North Dakota Indians, living on reservations, and working with problem areas of Indian rights support this conclusion. See generaUy United
States v. Vulles, 282 F. Supp. 829 (D. Mont. 1968).
52. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). See also Seufert Bros. Co. v.
United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919).
53. United States v. Vulles, 282 F. Supp. 829, 830 (D. Mont. 1968). The court held
that once title to Indian land is fully extinguished, state law governs the rights to
property; Montana law does not grant to Indians special rights of way to cross privately
held lands. Accord Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431 (1928).
54. State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1955). The case dealt with assault and
battery charges and the state's lack of jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians on
reservations.
55. Id. at 513.
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Jondreau will probably not affect existing precedent in other
jurisdictions.
Jondreau was in possession of only four lake trout when arrested
and was clearly not engaged in commercial fishing. The bulk of
the litigation of Indian fishing rights has been in Alaska and Pacific
Coastal Regions where commercial interests are of paramount importance. 56 Because of the large commercial fishing interests and
their economic importance to non-Indians, the tribes in these regions
appear to have little hope of ever maintaining their absolute fishing
rights. In regions not having commercial fisheries, Jondreau may
be an effective guide. Two recent cases appear to support the
above conclusion. 57 State v. Gurnoe,5 a recent Wisconsin case
citing Jondreau, held that the same treaty governing Jondreauretained Indian fishing rights on Lake Superior. 59 State v. Moses, s0
a case arising in Washington, where commercial fishing is an important enterprise, did not rely on Jondreau or similar cases. Instead
it upheld the reasonable and necessary doctrine in a conviction of
Indians who were gill net fishing under alleged treaty rights; thus
upholding existing precedent and protecting the extensive commercial fishing interests in the region.
If Jondreau is to be an important precedent in future litigation
it will likely govern only cases with similar fact situations isolated cases of an Indian fishing or hunting for subsistence, where
commercial fishing is not endangered. Puyallup,61 Tulee,e 1 and
related cases will likely continue as precedent where commercial
interests are involved.
These standards are much too vague to adequately settle the
conflict between conservation and Indian treaty rights. Jondreau
sets down a more definite standard that protects the Indian tribes
from powerful resort and commercial fishing interests. Furthermore,
56. But see Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (D.
Minn. 1971). Here a resort owner's interests were being threatened by the possibility of
Indian commercial fishing in Minnesota.
57. State v. Gurnoe, 192 N.W.2d 892 (Wis. 1972); State v. Moses, 79 Wash.2d 104,
483 P.2d 832 (1971).
58. State v. Gurnoe, 192 N.W.2d 892 (Wis. 1972).
59. The defendants in Gurnoe, however, were fishing with a gill net and because of
this the court remanded the case to give the state an opportunity to show that reasonable regulations are needed for the preservation of fish. The court also stated that the
methods of fishing must reasonably conform to aboriginal methods and should not
be extended to modern methods not intended by the treaty. State v. Gurnoe, 192 N.W.2d
892, 902 (Wis. 1972). A concurring opinion criticized these limitations placed on the
treaty rights. Id. at 902. But see Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) where
Indian water rights were declared to be retained for present and future needs. It would
seem that, where Indians retain fishing rights, these rights would also be retained for
present and future needs. If, in the future, a commercial fishing need arises for the subsistence of Indians, it would seem reasonable that the Indians would have the right
to fish commercially, or at a minimum, have the right to use more modern methods.
60. State v. Moses, 79 Wash. 2d 104, 483 P.2d 832 (1971).
61. Puyallup v. Dept. of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
62. Tulee v. Wash., 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
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Jondreau recognizes that treaties are the supreme law of the land;
this is a fundamental principle of constitutional law.68
OWEN

L. ANDERSON

63. See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), where treaties with
Canada involving the preservation of game were held to be the supreme law of the land.

